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Sometimes happiness is as simple as seeing what is in front of our 
faces. Though the Duke Law Journal has hosted an administrative 
law symposium for the past forty-three years, there are few guidelines 
for the symposium’s design.  The executive board of Volume 62 knew 
that we would be responsible for organizing a symposium, but we had 
little notion of how we would carry out that responsibility. We need 
not have worried. 
In February of 2012, months before we planned to discuss our 
symposium, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis1 landed in 
front of our article selection committee. Professors John Bronsteen, 
Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur’s article captured the 
committee’s attention with its strong claim, accessible use of data, and 
good humor. Multiple committee members pointed to the rise of 
hedonic psychology in the past two decades2 and voiced enthusiasm 
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 1. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013). 
 2. See Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz, Preface to WELL-BEING: 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY, at ix, ix (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert 
Schwarz eds., 1999) (characterizing hedonic psychology as a distinctly new field of psychology); 
see also Jim Holt, Two Brains Running, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Nov. 27, 2011, at 16 (reviewing 
Daniel Kahneman’s THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011), and praising the author’s innovations 
in hedonic psychology). 
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for an article that grappled seriously with the possibility of applying 
new interdisciplinary findings to law. Consensus quickly developed to 
make Well-Being Analysis the first article we would offer to publish in 
Volume 62. 
Once we had decided to offer, however, a second question arose: 
would we make the article part of our administrative law symposium? 
On this question the committee was more hesitant. One prophetic 
editor warned that if we put Well-Being Analysis in the symposium, 
we had better be ready for it to be the subject of the symposium, 
because everyone would want to talk about it. We decided to defer 
the symposium question. We had months to think about it, after all, 
and we could always issue a call for papers in the fall. 
Five weeks later, we still had not discussed plans for the 
symposium, and Professor Matthew Adler’s article came before the 
article selection committee. Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: 
What’s the Use?3 was rich in philosophical argument and exhaustive in 
attention to fine distinctions. Even so, the committee was reluctant to 
publish two pieces on well-being analysis (WBA) in the same volume 
until one editor suggested what now seems obvious: our 
administrative law symposium was staring us in the face. Professor 
Adler’s article spoke directly to the proposals raised by Professors 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur, and even in that early draft 
Professor Adler cited a previous work by the trio. Why wait until the 
fall to solicit papers when we could build our symposium around two 
articles we already loved? In the two articles we had an opportunity 
not only to set a broad topic for the symposium, but also to promote a 
specific conversation among distinguished scholars—a conversation 
that crossed disciplines from law and economics to philosophy and 
neurobiology. It was a conversation that interested us, and we hoped 
it would interest others too. 
Happily for us, the authors accepted our offer. The symposium, 
which occurred on February 15, 2013, featured impassioned 
exchanges on the merits of WBA and revealed a generational divide 
between scholars that we had not expected back in March of 2012. 
Faculty members have asked the Duke Law Journal why it continues 
to host an administrative law symposium—surely more than forty 
years of administrative law is enough? This year’s symposium was a 
reminder of how broad conversations in culture and science can 
 
 3. Matthew D. Adler, Happiness Surveys and Public Policy: What’s the Use?, 62 DUKE 
L.J. 1509 (2013). 
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inform administrative law, and a small conversation about 
administrative law can portend large things for the way our 
government works. We could not be prouder to publish the pillars of 
that conversation, and supporting commentaries, here in the Duke 
Law Journal. 
This symposium is a forward-looking consideration of WBA, 
crystalizing the criticisms and limitations of cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) circa 2013. Perhaps most importantly, it contributes new 
considerations to an old field4 that has seen rapid academic and policy 
expansion since the 1970s. Hedonics became an applied discipline 
with the rise of the role—and idea—of CBA in the American 
regulatory state.5 In its essence, hedonics examines revealed 
preferences in order to price amenities that lack transparent or 
explicit markets. The monetary price of a bond, or a loaf of bread, has 
long been scrutinized by economists.6 But CBA, as a hedonic 
methodology, has tackled the harder task of valuing far more 
ephemeral goods, such as the value of clean air or the statistical risk 
of disease.7 Since the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the 
use of those valuations has been enshrined in executive orders and 
statutes as driving justifications for regulatory rulemaking and policy.8 
 
 4. The public-welfare analysis underlying CBA was first proposed as a principle of 
engineering by Jules Dupuit. See E.J. MISHAN & EUSTON QUAH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 243 
(5th ed. 2007) (noting that Dupuit introduced the concept of consumer surplus in 1844). The 
analysis was grafted into the welfare economics of Alfred Marshall. See ALFRED MARSHALL, 
ELEMENTS OF ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY 79 (3d ed. 1899) (“We may now turn to consider how 
far the price, which is actually paid for a thing, represents the satisfaction that arises from its 
possession. This is a subject on which economic science has very little to say, but that little is of 
some importance.”). 
 5. See generally Raymond B. Palmquist, Hedonic Models, in HANDBOOK OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 765 (Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh ed., 1999) 
(describing how hedonic models apply to environmental economics). 
 6. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON MONEY: THE PURE THEORY OF 
MONEY 200–09 (1930) (conducting an early and foundational analysis of financial interest 
rates); see also DAVID MCNALLY, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM: A 
REINTERPRETATION 93–94 (1990) (attributing the rise of the Physiocrats—a school of proto-
economists in eighteenth-century France—in part to the study of the grain trade). 
 7. For numerous examples and real-world applications of CBA, see generally EUSTON 
QUAH & RAYMOND TOH, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2012). 
 8. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152, 154 (1979) (requiring that agencies consider 
alternative means for achieving regulatory goals and that they choose “the least burdensome of 
the acceptable alternatives”). This mandate for cost-effectiveness was modified by President 
Reagan’s Executive Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982), which required that the benefits of a 
regulation exceed its costs; by President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 644–48 
(1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 note at 745, 747–49 (2006), and 5 U.S.C. § 601 
note at 126, 128–29 (Supp. V 2012), which required that all regulations be submitted for CBA by 
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Unsurprisingly, CBA faced attack from the get-go because it 
works to ascribe monetary-denominated prices to goods and 
amenities many may regard—either morally or intrinsically—as 
“priceless.”9 Such analysis, critics have contended, is “value laden” in 
that it ignores the distribution of individual price preferences for 
amenities.10 To some extent, this judgment was conceded early on. 
Otto Eckstein, a CBA pioneer and member of the president’s Council 
of Economic Advisers, noted in 1958 that “[t]here is no logical way of 
incorporating distributive effects into the benefit-cost analysis, which 
must confine itself to the one dimension of benefit for the country as 
a whole.”11 Still, CBA’s defenders have rightly contended that 
imperfect—even morally uncomfortable—measures are better than 
leaving regulation to agencies’ untutored, unfalsifiable hunches and 
assumptions.12 After all, the person on the street might insist that a 
human life is infinitely valuable, or that a price tag cannot be placed 
on clean water.13 But the preferences revealed by that person’s 
 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA); by President Bush’s Executive 
Order 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191, 191 (2008), which stressed the importance of new regulations being 
justified by “market failure”; and by President Obama’s Executive Order 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 
216–17 (2012), which encourages retrospective review of existing regulations and directs that 
CBA should consider “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.” 
 9. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (taking a critical approach to 
CBA’s focus on pricing amenities without taking into account the intrinsic values of those 
amenities); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 206 (1993) 
(“Consider the difficulties encountered in attempting to force all our valuations of 
environmental goods into the instrumental mold. People appreciate many environmental goods 
for their beauty. Appreciation is a mode of intrinsic valuation.”). 
 10. Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Classical Creed, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Fall 2001, 199, 201. The origins of CBA were rooted in Marshallian notions of welfare 
economics and the marginal utility of income. In 1932, economist Lionel Robbins articulated the 
criticisms of this Marshallian approach by arguing that “economists, as scientists, could say 
nothing about the relative pleasures of a Brahmin and an untouchable.” Id. (summarizing 
LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 
(1932)).  
 11. OTTO ECKSTEIN, WATER-RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF PROJECT 
EVALUATION 36 (3d prtg. 1965). 
 12. See John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in RISKS, COSTS, 
AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 183, 189 (Robert W. Hahn 
ed., 1996) (“When potential dangers are brought to the attention of federal agencies, agencies 
need to assess those dangers in a responsible manner. Congress can work to inculcate a strong 
sense of responsibility by requiring agencies to follow several basic principles of sound risk 
assessment practice.”). 
 13. John Graham suggests that the public is no better than administrative agencies at 
intuitive valuations of costs and benefits, arguing that “[w]e are paranoid in the sense that we 
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economic behavior, hedonics scholars point out, indicate otherwise: 
our daily behavior reveals that we do in fact price the “priceless.”14 
At first glance, WBA is merely a contribution to the hedonics 
literature. But its appeal for this symposium extends beyond simply 
pushing the boundaries of hedonic methodology. Rather, WBA 
proposes to refocus hedonics away conceptually from monetary-
denominated regression analysis to a psychological unit of perceived 
well-being. In a sense, WBA connects the econometric and 
psychometric sides of hedonics into policy-exploitable research. And 
it does so in a way that satisfies the moral and intuitive difficulties 
that inhere in traditional CBA. The social scientist, the politician, the 
regulator, the ethicist, and the person on the street might all agree 
that empirically informed regulation is preferable to the hunch-based 
approach of a pre-CBA era. Yet, hereto, that agreement might very 
well have been one of principle only, breaking down with the 
problems associated with CBA methodology.15 In this symposium, 
Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur have introduced a 
methodology that erects a bridge between these constituents’ 
empirical, policy, and moral concerns. In other words, they may have 
suggested a way to make hedonics work for all the consumers (and 
critics) of CBA. 
Nevertheless, Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur 
acknowledge that this is only a beginning framework. Doing empirical 
hedonics is difficult enough when talking dollars and euros. 
Quantifying well-being units perhaps requires a totally different 
experimental apparatus. Indeed, the call for WBA requires a 
quantitative instrument for happiness. Professor Adler, this 
symposium’s counterpoint to Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and 
Masur, criticizes existing happiness studies in economics as lacking 
 
devote large amounts of resources and attention to alleged dangers that are speculative (at best) 
and probably small (or even nonexistent).” Id. at 184.  
 14. In a seminal article that gave birth to contemporary hedonic economics, Sherwin Rosen 
argued that hedonics is a process of individuals sorting between monetary (for example, 
housing) and non-monetary (for example, weather) considerations. See Sherwin Rosen, 
Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. 
ECON. 34, 35 (1974) (“[P]rice . . . guides both consumer and producer locational choices 
regarding packages of characteristics bought and sold. . . . As usual, market clearing 
prices . . . fundamentally are determined by the distributions of consumer tastes and producer 
costs.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 12, at 199 (“Many human health and environmental 
benefits remain difficult to quantify (for example, the monetary value of slightly improved 
visibility on summer days).”). 
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econometric rigor. If Professor Adler’s criticism hits the mark, then 
the path toward a rigorous and useful happiness or well-being 
instrument may stretch many miles past the current state of the field. 
But Professors Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur have started down 
that path, providing an intellectual framework for making happiness a 
quantifiably actionable consideration. If CBA is gauche for ascribing 
monetary-denominated prices to hedonic goods and amenities, WBA 
provides both rigor and also a measure of price more in tune with our 
intuitions about the intrinsic value of things like clean air, safe cities, 
unadulterated food, or even our own statistical mortality. 
We consider ourselves fortunate to have received two 
outstanding contributions to the role of hedonics in administrative 
law in the same submissions season. Our symposium, A Happiness 
Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis, represents the Duke Law 
Journal’s commitment to a discussion of happiness and policy that 
will continue at all levels of government. It is a topic that implicates 
important values of daily life, and each article and commentary 
speaks thoughtfully to the promises and limitations of well-being 
analysis. Whatever the future of well-being and cost-benefit analyses, 
the Duke Law Journal is excited to present some of the best work in 
the field in 2013. 
 
